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Abstract. There are four main positions in the argument about whether 
God exists: atheism (God does not exist), theism (God exists), agnosticism 
(it is impossible to know whether God exists or not), and scepticism (at the 
moment we do not know whether God exists or not). From an epistemological 
standpoint, scepticism is the most rational; even if a decisive argument which 
would settle the debate has not been discovered yet, one cannot exclude the 
possibility of finding it eventually. Agnosticism is too radical (and even 
incoherent), but theism and atheism exceed the available data. However, from 
a practical standpoint, choosing theism or atheism seems to be more rational 
than scepticism (not to mention agnosticism); one of them is bound to be right, 
because there are only two possibilities, one of which has to be true: either God 
exists or not.
The main thesis I  am going to defend1 is that currently the question 
of whether God exists remains unanswered because the available data 
does not enable us to settle it. It does not mean that there is no possible 
evidence which could settle the dispute about the existence of God 
or that we will never be able to discover it; still, even if such evidence 
exists, we do not know it at the moment. In other words, this will be 
an attempt to justify the thesis that the most adequate standpoint on the 
matter of whether God exists is scepticism. First I will present my main 
assumptions, mainly concerning the concept of God (point 1), next I will 
outline the main standpoints on the matter and show the difficulties of 
1 A shorter version of this paper was presented during the international conference 
‘Epistemology of Atheism’, organized by Professor Roger Pouivet in Nancy (France) in 
June 2013. I am indebted to all participants for their useful comments to the first version 
of the paper. The paper was translated into English by Agnieszka Ziemińska.
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theism (point 2), atheism (point 3), and agnosticism (point 4). Finally, in 
the last (and most important part), I will move on to the explication and 
attempt to justify scepticism (point 5).
I. ASSUMPTIONS
The main assumption is the belief that a rational discussion about the 
existence of God is possible. This means that the question whether God 
exists (and even more – what we know about God’s existence) is rational. 
Regardless of whether there is a  way of solving it, the problem is not 
senseless. On one hand, we know what we are talking about when talking 
about God’s existence, on the other hand we understand what the possible 
solutions to the problem are (that is the different answers to the question: 
does God exist?). I therefore assume that, despite some opinions (mostly 
defended by such philosophers as A. J. Ayer, Ninian Smart, Paul Edwards, 
Kai Nielsen or Anthony Flew before his conversion), sentences like ‘God 
exists’, ‘God does not exist’ or ‘we do not (and never will) know whether 
God exists or not’ make sense.
I  also assume that it is possible to discuss the problem of God’s 
existence on a philosophical level. I will therefore try to avoid discussing 
the problem on a religious or common-sense base, treating the problem 
of God’s existence as a theoretical question. Statements like ‘God exists’ 
or ‘God does not exist’ will be treated not as religious or nonreligious 
expressions but as metaphysical beliefs.
The next assumption concerns the concept of God I will be using. It 
is not an empirical concept (at least in the sense of a sense experience or 
its necessary connection with a sense experience); still it may be given 
an understandable meaning. The fundamental elements of this concept 
correspond with how God is understood by the monotheistic religions. 
Therefore it is neither a  finite nor limited being (like Zeus); it also is 
not part of the world (it is not the entire world or an arrangement of 
finite things). It is a transcendent being in relation to the world (not in 
a dimensional, but ontic sense, resulting from a different way of existing). 
God has to be an independent being; that is, in His existence He does not 
depend on anything, having the foundation of His being in Himself (ens 
a se). God has to be a necessary being both existentially and essentially; 
this means that if He does exist, then He necessarily exists (God cannot 
be a random being that only happened to exist), and has to be necessarily 
entitled to all His attributes (which do not accidentally result from His 
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nature). God also has to be able to take action, be almighty (as in being 
able to do what is logically possible to do).2 It would seem that He should 
also be an infinite being when it comes to the quantity as well as quality 
of attributes; that is, God should have an infinite number of attributes 
on a  maximal level. However, since the concept of infinity (especially 
quantitative) leads to paradoxes, the attribute of infinity should be 
negatively defined as a  lack of any ontic or axiological limits. It would 
mean that God is a flawless being and therefore deserves the appellation 
of an absolute being. Defined like this, God has to be a unique being; for 
if it were possible to think of two absolute beings, they would have to 
somehow be different and therefore at least one of them would not meet 
the criteria of an absolute being (one would have to have at least one 
deficiency or shortage). That is why the concept of God rules out being 
multitude.3 Moreover, God – as a being able to take action – should have 
the attributes of a person (at least the ability to experience and evaluate 
different actions and choose between them). However, as almighty, He 
does not need a body but could effectively act by direct effectiveness of 
the will.4
Despite the adduced attributes, the concept of God is fundamentally 
negative since we could say more about what God is not than about 
what God really is. Still, He should not be treated as an  Absolute 
Mystery (because this concept, if understood literally, is incoherent; it 
suggests that even though God is inscrutable, we do know about His 
inscrutability).
We can assume that this description of God is apparently coherent 
and therefore God is a possible being (or at least there are no arguments 
to assume that He is an impossible being). Proving the possibility of God 
is not necessary, because for the purpose of our discussion the thesis 
that His possibility is not out of the question is enough.5 Moreover, 
2 Thanks to such a definition we can omit the stone’s paradox, formulated in modern 
terminology by C. W. Savage in his article ‘The Paradox of the Stone’, Philosophical 
Review (1967), pp.  74-79. This new and careful concept of omnipotence is recently 
defended by Richard Swinburne. See, for example, his book The Coherence of Theism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 1993).
3 The most important defence of the uniqueness of the absolute being is, of course, 
Spinoza’s Ethics (part one: ‘Of God’).
4 We could find this concept in the Jewish Bible. According to me, it is possible to 
understand in such a way the metaphor of the word by which God has created the world.
5 An excellent defence of the coherence of God is Swinburne`s book The Coherence 
of Theism.
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even if a  correct proof of the possibility of God were not possible, it 
still would not prove that God is impossible, because we have no proof 
of the incoherency of the concept of God. Meanwhile it is difficult to 
decide who bears the burden of proof. Usually it is the duty of whoever 
formulates a more radical thesis, however in the dispute over whether 
the concept of God is coherent or not (and if it is possible to prove it) we 
do not know (nor can we settle in a neutral manner) which thesis is more 
radical. That is why we can consider the concept of God coherent and 
God as a possible being (at least until it is proven otherwise).
The main problem is the question of whether God exists, that is, if 
the outlined concept has an  exemplification in reality. I  assume that 
when raising the question of God’s existence we do not only want to 
believe that He does or does not exist but know about Him (or at least 
have conclusive arguments for our belief or disbelief). I  understand 
demanding knowledge as demanding certainty (or at least a probability 
higher than the probability of potential opposing hypotheses). I  also 
assume the realist (correspondent) concept of truth, so the statement 
‘God exists’ is true if God does actually exist, and false if He does not.
II. THE MAIN STANDPOINTS
There are four main standpoints on the issue of whether God exists: 
theism, atheism, agnosticism, and scepticism. Theism is a belief that God 
exists (the statement ‘God exists’ is true) and that we are able to justify it 
by rational argumentation.
Atheism is a belief that God does not exist (the statement ‘God exists’ 
is false whereas ‘God does not exist’ is true) and that we are able to justify 
it by rational argumentation. Atheism is not just a  simple negation of 
theism (or a  refusal to acknowledge the truthfulness of the statement 
‘God exists’), but a positive claim that God does not exist (it is not only 
the lack of conviction that God exists, but a conviction that He does not).6
Agnosticism is a belief that we do not know and never will whether 
God does or does not exist (this lack of knowledge is not relative to time 
6 This means that I understand atheism in the traditional metaphysical way, which is 
different from the new concept of atheism (a-theism), defended by John Schellenberg. 
Schellenberg defines atheism as the negation of a personal God. See John Schellenberg, 
Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1993); Prolegomena to a  Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1995).
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or circumstances but essential and irremovable). Agnosticism is not 
only refusing to acknowledge the truthfulness of theism or atheism but 
is a positive claim that it is impossible to settle the dispute over God’s 
existence.7
Scepticism is a belief that we do not know if God does exist or not, 
but unlike agnosticism, it does not claim that we will never know the 
answer (although a lack of knowledge is our current situation, it is not 
necessarily impossible to overcome). Scepticism on the issue of God’s 
existence is not only a  suspension of judgment (a  lack of acceptance 
for theism, atheism, or agnosticism) but, just like the three previously 
presented standpoints, is a positive claim, that we currently do not know 
if God exists or not. Scepticism does not deny the possibility of settling 
the dispute in the future (e.g. by discovering data which would prove 
the truthfulness of theism, atheism, or agnosticism). Scepticism does 
not claim that any of the three other standpoints are false, but that we 
currently do not know which (if any) is true or false. Understood like 
this, scepticism is not a total lack of knowledge (ignorance about one’s 
own ignorance), but it is limited to not knowing whether God exists.
Besides the four mentioned standpoints, one more could be singled 
out: radical scepticism, which is understood as a complete suspension of 
judgment about the existence of God; however this standpoint rules out 
the possibility of any discussion and therefore will not be considered.
As I  said before, this paper is an  attempt to justify the thesis that 
among the highlighted standpoints on the issue of whether God exists, 
scepticism is the most adequate one. Meanwhile theism, atheism, and 
agnosticism (understood as theoretical standpoints) go beyond the 
available data. From a  practical point of view it may be different  – 
scepticism might turn out to be the least desirable (and even the least 
rational); however as a theoretical standpoint it is the most credible (and 
the most rational, if by rationality we mean the correlation between the 
level of acceptance for a  statement and the arguments on behalf of its 
truthfulness).
7 My definition of agnosticism is, of course, connected with Kantian epistemology; 
I  do not identify agnosticism with disbelieving in God because of lack of proof of 
His existence (as some philosophers do), but with our lack of knowledge about God’s 
existence.
148 IRENEUSZ ZIEMIŃSKI
III. THEISM
As mentioned before, theism comes down to the thesis that God exists 
(the statement ‘God exists’ is true whereas ‘God does not exist’ is false). 
According to theists, this claim can be proven with certainty or at least 
with a high (higher than other hypotheses) probability. This means that 
the truthfulness of the statement ‘God exists’ is absolutely true (excluding 
the possibility of it turning out to be false) or at least more probable 
(with the accessible data) than the truthfulness of atheism, agnosticism, 
or scepticism.
Usually two types of arguments are made for theism: a  priori 
arguments (referring to the content of the concept of God) and 
a posteriori arguments (supposed to prove the existence of God based 
on the empirical evidence). Some arguments are considered certain 
while others are treated as ways of proving theism to be probable. This 
distinction does not overlap with the distinction between a priori and 
a  posteriori arguments since among the first group some are merely 
attempts at making theism probable while some in the second group are 
attempting to prove the certainty of theism. A priori arguments are usually 
called ontological arguments whereas typical examples of an a posteriori 
argument are different versions of the cosmological argument.
The meaning of ontological arguments (regardless of how they are 
formulated in details) comes down to the claim that the existence of God 
results from the content of the name ‘God’ (it is impossible to think of 
God without at the same time thinking of His actual existence). This 
means that the statement ‘God does not exist’ is not only false but also 
self-contradictory.
There is no need to present all the criticism in the history of philosophy 
against the ontological argument.8 It is however worth noticing that the 
main argument which was usually treated as a way of effectively refuting 
the ontological argument – the inability to treat existence as a predicate – 
is wrong (or at least there is not enough proof to treat is as right). 
Without going into details, it could be argued that even if existence is 
not a predicate (which in itself is doubtful) then possible existence, real 
existence, or necessary existence certainly is.9 Moreover, we also do not 
8 These problems are discussed in detail by Graham Oppy in his book Ontological 
Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
9 The thesis was defended by Norman Malcolm in his article ‘Anselm’s Ontological 
Arguments’, Philosophical Review (1960), pp. 41-62.
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know whether real existence is a predicate which should be attributed 
to God as an  absolute being since there is no guarantee that real 
existence is a perfection. Regardless of the axiological discussion about 
the (positive or negative) value of existence, the ontological argument 
presents a different, more serious difficulty concerning the inability to 
prove the existence of God as a  being radically transcendent towards 
the world. Even if we agree that the ontological argument is an effective 
mean of proving the necessity of the existence of some being, then it is 
still useless in proving the existence of a  specific being (especially one 
transcendent to the world). The only existential statement which can 
be proved a priori is the statement ‘something exists’.10 Its trustfulness 
seems absolutely certain, since there are no possible conditions in which 
it would be false; ‘something exists’ can never turn out to be false – in 
a extreme situation at least the statement itself will exist (if it were to be 
false, then it would not be able to exist). The negation of the statement 
(‘it is not true that something exists’ or expressed differently – ‘nothing 
exists’) is clearly false, because there are no possible conditions in which 
it could be true. If ‘nothing exists’ were to be true, then it would be 
impossible for the statement to exist. Therefore the statement ‘something 
exists’ is not only a truth but a logically necessary truth. The problem is, 
however, that ‘something exists’ is a formula with one variable so it can 
be treated as a short version of ‘at least one x exists’; but this formula does 
not prove specifically which x exists. If the word ‘something’ is replaced 
by any other name (God, chair, number, beauty) then none of the new 
sentences is necessarily true (its negation may be true). This means that 
even if something has to exist it does not mean that a specific being has 
to exist (even if this being was to be God). That is why the ontological 
argument cannot be acknowledged as conclusive.
Cosmological arguments (without going into the differences between 
specific formulations) are usually based on two main assumptions: the 
first one being a  claim about the ontological (especially existential) 
contingency of the world, the other the thesis that the existence and 
structure of the world must have reason and explanation. These 
assumptions however, being the only way to justify the existence of 
10 M. K. Munitz says that we could say also that the sentence ‘the Universe exists’ 
is a necessary truth. See his books The Mystery of Existence: An Essay in Philosophical 
Cosmology (New York: New York University Press, 1974); The Ways of Philosophy (New 
York; London: Macmillan, 1979).
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God in an  empirical way, also cause every cosmological argument 
to get caught in a  vicious circle. Claiming that the world (and all its 
elements) is contingent may be true only if we assume it was created 
by an  absolute and necessary being; since the contingency we are 
talking about is existential, the contingency of the world means that it 
is created every moment by a being which is the only adequate reason 
for its existence. The assumption about the contingency of the world 
understood like this is necessary because only a  radically dependent 
creature (essentially dependent, consecutive, endangered by a constant 
possibility of collapsing into nothingness) may be a basis for a claim that 
there is a necessary being keeping the world in existence. So if we do not 
ascribe contingency to the world, we will not have adequate data for the 
thesis about the existence of its metaphysical and transcendent cause. 
At the same time, however, we can only say that the world is contingent 
when we state its dependence on the necessary being (that is, we assume 
the existence of God as the world’s reason in the premises).
The second foundation of the cosmological arguments  – the rule 
of sufficient reason – brings a similar difficulty. If the world must have 
an  adequate reason for its existence (and nature), and this reason 
(because of the contingency of the world) cannot be immanent, then 
it can only be a  transcendent necessary being. However assuming the 
metaphysical contingency of the world and the necessity of the reason of 
the world we beg the question, proclaiming the existence of a necessary 
being (excluding a priori other possibilities like the hypothesis of a world 
without any ultimate ontic reason or the hypothesis of the necessity of the 
world) as true. Thereby we can accept the premises of the cosmological 
argument as true only if we have already assumed its conclusion.
We deal with a  similar situation in cases of different attempts of 
theistic arguments, for example referring to religious experiences or 
a supernatural Revelation (as a source of knowledge about the existence 
of God). If a specific experience is defined as a religious experience (as 
experiencing the direct presence of God) then the problem of God’s 
existence is solved at the beginning by treating a religious experience as 
credible. However, the criteria of authenticity for religious experiences 
are inevitably subjective; just because some people think they 
experienced the presence of God does not mean God actually exists (or 
that He was subject to someone’s religious perception). In all cases of 
such an experience, there is the possibility of illusion.
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There are similar difficulties when attempting to justify theism based 
on a supernatural Revelation, miracles, or common belief in God during 
human history. This situation persuades us to conclude that (at least for 
now) we do not have a conclusive argument settling the dispute about 
the existence of God in favour of theism.
Showing the incorrectness (non-conclusiveness) of arguments 
supposed to justify the hypothesis that God exists by no means proves 
theism to be false. It does however show, that with the available data, 
the theistic hypothesis goes too far beyond the evidence, which was 
supposed to be in favour of God’s existence. Precisely, this evidence can 
only be treated as credible arguments justifying theism if we understand 
it in the context of the previously assumed theistic thesis. In other words, 
recognizing specific data as evidence for theism is only possible if it is 
seen as the results of the actual existence of God (that is, by assuming 
theism is true).
IV. ATHEISM
Atheism is a  standpoint claiming that God does not exist, that is, the 
statement ‘God does not exist’ is true and can be proved by rational 
argumentation. The truthfulness of the statement ‘God does not exist’ 
is certain or at least more probable than other hypotheses (especially 
theism). One of the attempts to justify the truthfulness of atheism is by 
referencing the non-conclusiveness of all theistic arguments (the fact 
that the arguments in favour of God’s existence are non-conclusive is 
considered as an argument for the truthfulness of atheism). However this 
justification is not enough, since disproving the arguments in favour of 
the truthfulness of the statement ‘God exists’ does not in any way prove 
the truthfulness of ‘God does not exist’; atheism, as a positive conviction 
needs stronger arguments. Usually they are a priori arguments which are 
supposed to prove the contradictory nature of the concept of God (also 
called ontological anti-arguments) and a posteriori arguments which are 
supposed to show it is impossible to reconcile the existence of God with 
some facts in the world.
When it comes to the first type of argumentation, the most common 
form is the attempt to prove that the concept of God as a being existentially 
necessary is self-contradictory (or even nonsensical). If God necessarily 
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exists then the statement ‘God exists’ must be an  analytically true 
whereas the statement ‘God does not exist’ analytically false. However if 
the negation of any fact is not self-contradictory then any existence (also 
the existence of God) must be completely contingent. In that case, the 
concept of a necessary existing being has to be considered nonsensical 
(analogically to the concept of a  square circle or a  mountain without 
a valley), and thus God cannot exist.11
This objection is not conclusive, since it could be argued that the 
concept of a  necessary being is rational (and not self-contradictory) 
and not only as an independent being but also as a being entitled to the 
predicate of a necessary being; even then the statement ‘God (a necessary 
being) exists’ would not have to be understood as an  analytical and 
necessary truth. While the statement ‘God exists’ could indeed be 
an analytical truth for an absolute mind, but does not necessarily have to 
be such for a finite, human mind. Apart from all that, it could be noticed 
that the argument referring to the absurdity of the concept of God as 
an  argument in favour of atheism (understood as a  claim that theism 
is not just false, but it is absurd) has an  undesirable consequence for 
atheism itself; if the statement ‘God exists’ is absurd then ‘God does not 
exist’ should be considered just as an absurd as well.
Other attempts to prove the contradictory nature of the concept of 
God (and therefore the impossibility of its exemplification), referencing 
paradoxes supposed to be connected to some attributes ascribed to 
God, are just as non-conclusive. One of the paradoxes is the sometimes 
suggested contradiction of the concept of omnipotence (if God is 
almighty then He can create a stone He would not be able to carry, and 
that falsifies the thesis about his omnipotence). If God is not almighty 
then He is a  limited being and therefore does not deserve the name 
of an  absolute (perfect) being. It is sometimes attempted in a  similar 
manner to ascertain the impossibility of reconciling infinite mercy with 
infinite justice or God’s immutability/constancy with His consciousness. 
However, all these (and similar to them) arguments are based on arbitrary 
(and uncertain) definitions of God’s attributes. Nevertheless, nothing 
stands in the way of assuming such limitations of God’s omnipotence 
or justice which would allow us to avoid the mentioned paradoxes. 
Moreover, even if there is a problem with the correct articulation of the 
11 This argument was defended by Bertrand Russell, Paul Edwards, and in more 
sophisticated form by J. N. Findlay in his famous proof of God’s nonexistence.
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actual meaning of God’s attributes, it still does not decide about His 
nonexistence (and even more about the impossibility of His existence). 
Therefore all attempts to prove the nonexistence of God by referring to 
the alleged inconsistency of His concept should be considered too weak 
to justify atheism.
Another form of justifying atheism are a posteriori arguments, mostly 
the problem of evil (the undeniable fact of evil existing in the world is 
supposed to rule out the existence of God). To cut it short, evil is treated 
as impossible to reconcile with God’s goodness (as infinitely good, God 
should want to eliminate evil) and His omnipotence (as almighty God 
should be able to eradicate evil) therefore if evil exists, God cannot 
(being both infinitely good and almighty).
Supporters of the argument from evil sometimes add that any 
theodicy attempting to define evil not as directly caused by God but 
merely allowed by Him for certain reasons is illusory since in the case of 
an absolute being, creating something and allowing something to exist 
is the same action. Occasionally atheists declare that they respect God 
more than theists since by trusting that God (if He existed) would not 
permit any evil in the world, they prefer to negate His existence rather 
then hold Him responsible for the nightmare of unnecessary evil causing 
people (and other creatures capable of feeling) to suffer. This means that 
an atheist does not blame God whereas a theist, when trying to justify the 
existence of evil in the world, has to admit that the almighty and infinitely 
merciful God is (at least partially) responsible for it. This argument is 
based on the assumption that a theist commits blasphemy against God 
(blaming Him for evil and trying to defend Him) while an  atheist by 
denying God’s existence in the face of evil, does not ascribe any negative 
traits to God which would be in conflict with God’s essence. Moreover, 
according to an atheist any arguments provided by the theist justifying 
why evil should exist in the world rather than not, are insufficient. They 
are all based on a anthropomorphic picture of God, ascribing to Him 
motives characteristic for people and not for an absolute being.
Without going into details of the argument about the presence of 
evil in the world one has to conclude that at least three arguments seem 
important to reconcile theistic position with the reality of evil. Firstly, 
the hypothesis of the greater good, claiming that without some types of 
evil some types of good could not exist (without suffering there would 
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be no compassion or helping the suffering).12 The second argument is 
the thesis that facing the impossibility to create another absolute being, 
whatever He decides to create will be ontologically less perfect than God 
(evil as a form of imperfection is therefore a structural element of beings 
created as such). The third argument is the impossibility of excluding the 
truthfulness of the hypothesis of eschatological redemption in a cosmic 
universal salvation. This is why the argument about evil cannot be treated 
as a sufficient justification of atheism.
When it comes to the charge of having an anthropomorphic picture 
of God (inevitable in any theodicy) it should be stated that nobody 
trying to discuss God is free of this problem (also an atheist, agnostic, 
and sceptic). The thesis that all we know and experience, we know and 
experience as human beings (even if we constantly make the effort for 
it to be non-relativist, accurate). It is also difficult to treat the argument 
of the possible lack of respect for God shown by the theist who tries to 
defend Him and justify evil in the world, seriously. The case of supposed 
respect for God or lack of it is irrelevant in a theoretical discussion about 
the existence of God. This discussion does not concern how we are 
supposed to address God, but whether God actually exists. Atheism may 
come from really great respect for the being God would be if He existed, 
whereas theism may be connected with hostility towards God (or at least 
rebelling against Him). However, these attitudes are irrelevant to settling 
the metaphysical dispute about whether God exists, because they do not 
affect the logical value of both the theists’ and atheists’ claims.
These remarks show that also atheism (analogically to theism) should 
be considered a position going beyond the original testimonies supposed 
to justify it. This means that the evidence upon which an  atheistic 
argumentation is based may only be considered adequate in justifying the 
statement ‘God does not exist’ if we earlier assume that God indeed does 
not exist and understand the available evidence (like evil) and concepts 
used to describe God’s attributes (infinite mercy and almightiness) in the 
context of this assumption.
V. AGNOSTICISM
The indicated problems with attempting to justify theism and atheism 
may incline one to assume the agnostic position in the discussion about 
12 For more about this argument, see Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem 
of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
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God’s existence. Agnosticism is a belief that we do not and never will 
know the answer to the question whether God exists or not. The first 
argument in favour of agnosticism is the fact that theistic and atheistic 
argumentations are inconclusive. Since the fact that none of the theistic 
arguments is conclusive does not prove the truthfulness of atheism just 
like the inconclusiveness of atheistic arguments does not prove theism 
right, this could point towards the impossibility of settling the matter of 
God’s existence. Despite being able to formulate multiple inconclusive 
arguments in favour of theism or atheism, no multiplication of them 
will make one claim more probable than the other. The difficulties of 
theism (evil in the world, troubles with an  adequate description of 
God’s attributes) or atheism (rationality of the world and at the same 
time none of its elements being unnecessary) are not enough to prove 
the opposite standpoint is true. What’s more, it would be difficult to 
pinpoint a  neutral criterion by which we could judge the importance 
and meaning of specific theistic and atheistic arguments (individually 
or collectively). After all, it is hard to agree that religious experiences are 
more important evidence than evil, or that the contingency of the world 
is a more adequate description of the world than its existential autonomy. 
We also cannot agree that despite the sometimes formulated arguments 
one of the hypotheses (theism or atheism) should be considered true 
because of its simplicity.13 For on one hand the rule of simplicity may 
be a  fruitful methodological rule in science but does not necessarily 
have to be an obvious metaphysical rule, on the other it is impossible to 
decide which of the competing hypotheses is simpler (the only difference 
between them is that theism is an affirmation whereas atheism a negation 
of the existence of a specific being).
Axiological and pragmatic arguments also cannot settle the dispute. 
On occasion atheists argue that their life is more heroic since it lacks 
the final fundament and guidance (at the same time free from egoistic 
morality, aiming at an afterlife prize), whereas theists try to argue that 
their life is based on unshakable and absolutely certain rules. However 
these types of arguments are entirely subjective and cannot be taken 
into account when trying to settle the theoretical dispute about God’s 
existence. They may of course be relevant to the question of how to live, 
they can also have various persuasive or therapeutic purposes (giving 
a sense of, say, our participation in God creating the world or awakening 
13 This is the idea defended by Richard Swinburne.
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awareness of being responsible in the world whose fate is entirely up 
to humans), but are totally irrelevant to the question of whether God 
exists. This does not mean that theistic and atheistic arguments have 
no cognitive value. They can bring our attention to certain aspects of 
the world which we did not notice earlier or did not understand their 
importance (the argument from evil exposes the world’s multiple flaws, 
whereas the argument from Revelation its dimensions, hard to explain 
in the frames of radical naturalism); however these arguments are either 
heuristic or persuasive14 but they are not conclusive. Both atheist and 
theist cannot know if God exists or not, but they can only believe in His 
existence or nonexistence. So it could be concluded that in this situation 
agnosticism, as a belief that we do not know (and never will) whether 
God does exist or not, appears to be the most reasonable position.
When you put it like this, agnosticism is not a  justified position. 
Despite the remarks about the inconclusiveness of all theistic and 
atheistic arguments being accurate, they are not enough to settle the 
dispute about the existence of God in favour of agnosticism. Theistic and 
atheistic arguments being incorrect (and also impossible to compare to 
each other as John Hick said) is not enough to prove that knowledge 
about the existence of God is out of the question. Agnosticism is right 
in claiming that we do not know whether God exists, but goes beyond 
the available evidence by saying that we will never know the answer. By 
stating the fundamental impossibility of having knowledge about the 
existence of God, an agnostic basically makes an additional assumption 
about the inscrutability of God’s existence/non-existence. This statement 
however does not hold up, at least when understood literally since it 
is self-contradictory; if we claim that we cannot know anything about 
the existence/non-existence of God we in fact assume that we know at 
least one truth about His existence (that we do not know nothing about 
it). Moreover, assuming the absolute inscrutability of God’s existence/
non-existence would make it impossible to even formulate the question 
(we would not know what we are talking about). In that case it is crucial 
to assume some sort of restriction to agnosticism; this viewpoint does 
not mean that we know nothing about the existence/non-existence of 
God, but that the problem is insolvable; but in declaring the problem 
of God’s existence/non-existence insolvable we really say that we know 
something about the problem (that it is insolvable).
14 They are called ‘the situations of disclosure’ by Ian Ramsey.
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However, even this restriction to agnosticism is not enough to 
acknowledge this position as legitimate since the insolubility of the 
question whether God exists can be understood either objectively or 
subjectively. In the first case the insolubility would come from within 
God’s nature; this means that if God did not exist, no subject would 
be able to know it (which seems to be a coherent thesis). Still, if God 
did indeed exist no subject, even God himself, could know it; but this 
conclusion is absurd, because, if God is supposed to be God and He does 
exist, then at least He has to know about it. In that case the thesis that the 
question of whether God does exist or not is insoluble is unacceptable.
The claim that the insolubility of this problem comes from the 
limitations of the human mind is similarly difficult to agree with. The 
only argument in favour of this claim is the fact that until this day the 
question about God’s existence still has not been answered (or that we 
still do not know what evidence could help us to solve the problem). 
However, the current lack of knowledge is not enough to justify the 
impossibility of knowing. Moreover, it is difficult to assume that we 
have an insight into the nature of our minds which would allow us to 
determine the limitations of our knowledge (the limits between what we 
can and cannot find out). We therefore have to agree that agnosticism 
also goes beyond the available data concerning the existence of God. 
This means it should be considered to be as inconclusive as theism and 
atheism. This could make one speak in favour of scepticism, in case of 
God’s existence, as the most moderate standpoint.
VI. SCEPTICISM
Scepticism claims that we currently do not know whether God exists 
or not (but it does not exclude the possibility of solving the problem 
in the future). Three previously discussed standpoints came down to 
a choice: acknowledging one of the statements: ‘God exists’, ‘God does 
not exist’, ‘it is not possible for us to know whether God does or does 
not exist’ as true, despite none of the arguments supposedly in favour 
of theism, atheism, or agnosticism being sufficient to warrant this 
acknowledgment. Speaking in favour of scepticism is also a choice since 
it is not a conclusion of reasoning but a decision motivated by the lack 
of sufficient evidence in favour of the three mentioned standpoints. 
Choosing scepticism, however, seems to be the most rational decision, 
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because we really do not know not only whether God exists or not but 
even what could be a  neutral argument that would allow us to settle 
which of three standpoints is true.
Choosing scepticism, that is believing the statement ‘at the 
moment we do not know whether God does exist or not’ to be true, is 
epistemologically justified. While theism, atheism and agnosticism are 
inconclusive, scepticism turns out to be free from this difficulty, because 
it does not go beyond the available evidence.
Moreover, scepticism is also free from the paradoxes the other 
standpoints have to face. One of the problems with theism is that 
God’s existence is not obvious. If God is the only being which cannot 
be thought about as non-existing, then a  question arises: why is it so 
difficult to discover His existence, or at least prove it?15 Another difficulty 
theism has to face is the evident evil in the world; this does not disprove 
the theistic thesis but is a big problem that a theist has to face.
The world having a complicated (and at the same time organized and 
rational) structure is surely a problem for atheism. In every object we 
notice on one hand it being unnecessary (every object’s non-existence 
is at least possible), on the other its rational structure composed into 
a consistent system of other objects. This is why the world as an organized 
system of ontologically unnecessary objects naturally forces on a human 
mind the idea of a  transcendent mind which designed it and keeps it 
in existence. This means that existence and the rational structure of the 
world can barely be explained in just a naturalistic fashion (they may 
not prove the existence of a necessary being but can still be treated as 
its traces or signs). This is why atheism must exclude the possibility of 
interpreting the world as a trace of God (or at least prove its very low 
probability).
In the case of agnosticism we come across the impossibility of 
expressing it without contradicting ourselves. Claiming that knowledge 
about God’s existence/non-existence leads to either a  paradox, that 
even God himself could not know about His own existence, or to the 
incoherent thesis that we know the strict limitations of the human 
knowledge (separating what we can find out from what is impossible for 
us to get to know).
15 This problem was broadly discussed by John Schellenberg in Divine Hiddenness and 
Human Reason.
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The agnostic’s position seems to be the worst since he/she has to express 
his/her view in such a way as to avoid contradiction. However the theist 
and atheist also have to admit that the above mentioned problems with 
their standpoints are troublesome. Apart from all that, there is no neutral 
criterion which would help us to settle which of the mentioned problems 
are of greater importance. In that case, if agnosticism, theism, and 
atheism go beyond the available evidence risking additional difficulties, 
we have the right to choose scepticism as the least problematic viewpoint 
in the dispute about God’s existence. Scepticism also often faces serious 
charges but it is possible to at least weaken them if not refute.
One of the elementary counterarguments is ascribing an  absurd 
position of suspending judgment to the sceptic; this position, no 
different really than remaining completely silent, is supposed to make 
any discussion impossible so it is often ignored as quite irrational. This 
charge does not however apply to the version of scepticism defended in 
this paper. Scepticism about God’s existence is not a negative suspension 
of judgment but a positive judgment claiming that at the moment we do 
not know whether God exists or not.
On occasion scepticism is charged with leaving an  incredibly 
important (perhaps even the most important) matter for the human 
life in suspension. It is suggested that in the case of God’s existence/
non-existence (understood as an  absolutely unique matter deciding 
about the shape of our entire life) one has to have a specific standpoint 
even if it is not a certain or even probable conclusion. This would mean 
that in the case of God’s existence one is obliged to make a  specific, 
positive choice (preferably choosing theism or atheism and in extreme 
cases agnosticism). Meanwhile scepticism is the least rational because 
it suspends our entire life in a  void (or in an  absurd waiting for the 
potential settling of the matter in the future).
This charge does not seem to be accurate because one can argue that 
choosing between the existence and nonexistence of God is not necessary 
from the practical point of view; a person is capable of making the most 
crucial decisions affecting their life without espousing the truthfulness 
of either theism, atheism, or agnosticism. The potential necessity to 
settle the discussed matter could only appear in the case of people feeling 
a strong desire to be certain about the existence or non-existence of God. 
Such necessity is relative and subjective because it depends on specific 
life circumstances or a  person’s character traits. Of course in the case 
of such a  person, choosing theism or atheism rather than scepticism 
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may be more rational (in a pragmatic sense); such a solution however 
cannot resolve the theoretical discussion about whether God actually 
exists. Despite theism and atheism being more rational pragmatically 
(or more significant existentially), scepticism is still more rational 
epistemologically.
Another strategy to bring down scepticism is trying to prove it can 
never be consequently abided. This means that  – no matter what our 
theoretical beliefs are  – what we actually think about something is 
shown by our actions. So, even if we declare to be sceptics and at the 
same time take part in religious practices, then we are essentially theists; 
whereas if we claim to be sceptics and do not take part in any religious 
practices, then we are atheists. Since it is impossible to at the same time 
take and not take part in religious practices, any position we take will be 
a negation of scepticism.
This charge is not decisive if we make a  distinction between faith 
as a religious or non-religious position and a theoretical stance on the 
matter of God’s existence. On a  theoretical level, scepticism is clearly 
described as a  claim about our current lack of knowledge about the 
existence/non-existence of God whereas on the basis of faith (or religious 
practices) there may be a different solution. There is no contradiction 
between the belief that we currently do not know whether God exists or 
not and at the same time having faith that He does (and participating in 
appropriate religious practices) or believing He does not (and not taking 
part in religious practices). Despite such position might be rare, or even 
a sort of disparity between theoretical beliefs and religious faith, but it is 
certainly not impossible.
Moreover, one has to stress the fundamental independency of 
potential religious practices (or desisting from them) from theoretical 
beliefs; it is not the fact of fulfilling rituals that is important but the 
motivation behind it. One can be a  theist (believe the statement ‘God 
exists’ to be true) at the same time believing none of the religions to be 
an appropriate form of worshipping God; one can be an atheist, agnostic, 
or sceptic and still ardently fulfil specific religious rituals hoping they 
will either strengthen us in our convictions or allow us to break free from 
them, giving us a chance to discover previously unknown truths about 
God (nothing stands in the way of an atheist participating in religious 
practices searching either for a  confirmation of the thesis that God 
does not exist or for data which would allow him to reject atheism). No 
matter what the motivations are to fulfil (or not) religious practices, they 
161IN DEFENCE OF SCEPTICISM
in themselves have no means to solve the theoretical dispute about the 
existence/non-existence of God.
Sometimes the contradiction of scepticism is not seen as a  gap 
between theory and practice but within the theory itself (considered to 
be incoherent). If scepticism means declaring current lack of knowledge 
about something then it is contradictory because by proclaiming our 
lack of knowledge we already assume that we at least know about our 
lack of knowledge.
This charge, however, does not concern scepticism in the matter of 
God’s existence/non-existence since it is not global scepticism (claiming 
that we do not know anything about any matter), but local scepticism 
claiming only that the dispute about God’s existence is at the moment 
unsettled. Moreover, scepticism is not a  claim that we know nothing 
about the existence of God (we then would not be able to even state the 
question) but simply that currently we do not know whether God does 
or does not exist.
Sometimes another charge against scepticism is formulated. 
According to critics, only the claim that at the moment there is no 
evidence enabling us to settle the matter of God’s existence could justify 
scepticism. Sceptics, however, cannot know, that there is no evidence 
for the existence or nonexistence of God; such claim would go beyond 
available data. Sceptics can only say that he/she does not see evidence 
which could settle the dispute.
In answering, sceptics should accept that the statement ‘at the 
moment there is no evidence allowing us to settle the dispute about 
God’s existence’ is too strong. According to me it is true, that we do not 
know such data, but we cannot say that such evidence does not exist. 
So we must say that we do not recognize evidence supporting either the 
existence or nonexistence of God.
There is, however, a  more important charge, which seems to be 
the main argument against scepticism. This is the claim that if we are 
sceptics we are not able to recognise any evidence of His existence or 
nonexistence. This means that even if we see the God himself (or other 
quite obvious evidence of His existence), we could say that it is (or could 
be) simple illusion. Analogically, even if we see quite obvious evidence 
disproving God’s existence, we could say that it is (or could be) illusion. 
So scepticism is the position which we could not override in any rational 
way but only in irrational illumination or dark faith.
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This charge seems to me important and too difficult to answer. I hope, 
however, that this charge is not more difficult than counterarguments 
posed against theism, atheism, and agnosticism. According to some 
thinkers, if a  sceptic sees God and hears His voice, s/he would accept 
God’s existence. This is the position held by Norwood Russell Hanson: 
‘I’m not a stubborn guy. I would be a theist under some conditions. I’m 
open-minded.  ... Okay. Okay. The conditions are these: Suppose, next 
Tuesday morning, just after breakfast, all of us in this world are knocked 
to our knees by a persuasive and ear-shattering thunderclap. Snow swirls, 
leaves drop from trees, the earth heaves and buckles, buildings topple, 
and towers tumble. The sky is ablaze with an eerie silvery light, and just 
then, as all of the people of this world look up, the heavens open, and 
the clouds pull apart, revealing an  unbelievably radiant and immense 
Zeus-like figure towering over us like a hundreds Everests. He frowns 
darkly as lightning plays over the features of his Michelangeloid face, 
and then he points down, at me, and explains for every man, woman and 
child to hear: ‘I’ve had quite enough of your too-clever logic chopping 
and world-watching in matters of theology. Be assured Norwood Russell 
Hanson, that I do most certainly exist!’16
I am not sure if this story is plausible, because I can imagine a sceptic 
who sees God and hears His voice but still thinks that the figure or voice 
are illusions. So, the main difficulty in the sceptic’s position is that s/he 
could neither recognise any evidence as the evidence of God’s existence, 
nor recognise any evidence as the evidence of God’s nonexistence. In 
other words, if you are a sceptic, you will probably be a sceptic forever.
CONCLUSION
The result is rather depressing, because I should say that I do not know 
which theory is true – theism, atheism, agnosticism, or scepticism. I can 
say, however, that scepticism, as the least radical position, has the best 
justification, and that theism, atheism, and agnosticism go beyond the 
evidence. However, scepticism is not a good position from the practical 
point of view, because some humans cannot live without belief in God’s 
existence or nonexistence. I am afraid, however, that our choice could 
only be practical and axiological; so, it could not settle the question on 
16 N. R. Hanson, ‘What I Don’t Believe’, in Stephen Toulmin, Harry Woolf (eds), What 
I Do Not Believe, and Other Essays (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972), pp. 309-31 (p. 322).
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the theoretical level. We can believe that God exists or believe that He 
does not, but we do not know which belief is true. Both atheist and theist 
are in a good position, because they have a fifty percent chance of having 
made the right choice. This means that both theist and atheist are in 
much better position than a person who hopes to win in the gambling of 
even one dollar.
